On Searle’s notion of institutional facts

On Searle’s notion of institutional facts: Can status function declarations create institutional facts?

Introduction

There is no doubt that John Searle has substantially contributed to social ontology. What he calls ‘The Philosophy of Society’(Searle, 2010, p.5) provides a variety of epistemic resources which are significant for analysis of how our society is constituted. Therefore, Guala (2016, p.57) asserts that ‘[f]ew philosophers have had a greater impact on social ontology than John Searle’, and Machery (2014, p. 87) claims that Searle ‘has put forward one of the most influential answers’ to the question of social facts. However, despite Searl’s high evaluation, it has been argued that his argument often involves unclarity probably because of his ‘very confusing terminology’ (Epstein, 2015, p.59).

The purpose of this essay is to explain Searle’s notion of institutional facts and evaluate it by focusing on Searle’s notion of ‘status function declarations’. He discusses institutional facts in The Construction of Social Reality and Making the Social World. While most of his conceptual apparatus explained in the former work are taken over into the latter one, he adds an account of ‘declaration’ and ‘status function declarations’ by which institutional facts are created and maintained (Searle, 2010, pp.12–3). Therefore, this essay basically focusses on the latter theory unless otherwise indicated. 

This essay constitutes four parts. The first part summarises Searle’s argument about institutional facts, and the second part elucidates the notion of declarations and status function declaration. The third part examines some criticisms about Searle’s declaration and defends Searle’s claim from them by employing a conceptional distinction of declarations. The fourth part shall criticise the notion of declarations from my own point of view, and then I conclude.

1.Institutional Facts[1]

Institutional facts involve particular facts in human society such as “Theresa May is the British Prime Minister”, “this note is 20 pounds”, and “Scotland is a part of the United Kingdom”, which are different from ones in chemistry and physics. Searle explains the difference by adding to the traditional dichotomy between objective facts and subjective ones the distinction between an epistemic sense and an ontologic sense  (2010, pp.17–8). The ontologic distinction seems more familiar for us. For example, pain is ontologically subjective because it exists within experiences by human (or animals) subjects. Contrary to this, mountains and rivers are ontologically objective in the sense that their existence is independent of subjective experiences. In addition to this ontologic distinction, Searle introduces an epistemic distinction. For instance, “Walter Scot was born in 1771” is epistemically objective in the sense that it is not a mere opinion. On the other hand, “Walter Scot is more interesting than Thomas Carlyle” is epistemically subjective in the sense that it means a person’s attitude or opinion. Hence, Searle’s main question of and institutional facts is ‘How can there be an epistemically objective set of statements about a reality which is ontologically subjective?’(Searle, 2010, p.18)

Searle argues that, despite an enormous variety of different modes of social phenomena, there is a ‘logical structure’(2006, p.15) which underlies the constitution of social reality and institutional facts. Besides, he maintains that such a structure is comprised of some principles. We shall delve into four concepts pertaining to the logical structure.

First, Searle claims that social facts are created by ‘collective intentionality’. Intentionality denotes not only that subjects intend something but also that ‘feature of minds by which mental states are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world’(Searle, 2006, p.16). Social facts exist where intentionality is shared by different subjects, and such shared intentionality is referred to as collective intentionality. For instance, money exists in the sense that ‘we believe’ that this note is money. However, collective intentionality can be applied not only to human beings but also some other animals. In other words, social facts created by collective intentionality are different from institutional facts, which are a subset of social facts and include other principles (Searle, 2006, pp.16–7).  

Secondly, Searle argues that institutional facts have ‘status functions’, and human beings have the capacity to impose such functions on objects or people. functions denote a cause that serves a purpose, and humans collectively recognise that objects have functions which are performed beyond their physical functions (Searle, 2010, p.7,59). One of the examples is that we believe that Theresa May has the status function of the British Prime Minister.

Thirdly, the reason that such status functions are significant for human society is that the assignment of status functions elicits ‘deontic powers’ including rights, obligations, and permissions. Deontic powers, Searle maintains, provide us with reasons for acting that are independent of our desires. If followers, despite lacking the desire to obey their boss, obey him or her, then an obligation to obey the boss functions as a deontic power (Searle, 2010, pp. 8–9, 176).

Finally, institutional facts typically require institutions, and Searle basically considers institutions as a system of ‘constitutive rules’. Constitutive rules are the rules which do not merely regulate behaviour, rather constitute the possibility of the behaviour. For instance, the rules of chess do not just regulate how to move pieces on a board, but a game of chess itself is constituted by multiple rules. Searle argues that constitutive rules have the form ‘X count as Y in context C’, so we can say that “this note count as 20 pounds in the UK” (Searle, 2010, pp. 9–10).

2.Status Function Declarations

As we have argued so far, Searle argues that institutional facts, which are a subclass of social facts, require collective intentionality, status functions, and constitutive rules, and imply deontic powers. These key concepts describing the features of institutional facts can be found in both Searle’s two works of social ontology.

There are, however, some cases which might not fall into his account in the earlier work. Although he answers three objections,^[2] the most crucial one for this essay is what he calls ‘the ad hoc cases’, where institutional facts are created without a preexisting institution or constitutive rule (Searle, 2010, pp.19–20). According to his account in his earlier book, institutional facts require other institutions or constitutive rules. However, the example of ‘boundary’ which Searle gives by himself is ostensibly incompatible with this explanation. In the ‘boundary’ case, Searle (1995, pp.39–40) imagines a tribe that comes to treat a line of stones as a boundary even after the line collapses, but this example shows that the status function of a boundary is created without prior institutions or a system of constitutive rules. Thus, he comes to need an explanation of how the first institution is created without prior institutions.

Therefore, he introduces a new concept of ‘status function declarations’. Regarding the difference and development between the two works, he comes to see that ‘though “X counts as Y in C” is one form of status function declaration, there are also other forms’ (Searle, 2010, p.19). Before the second book, although he has argued that social facts are created by speech acts or ‘representation’ by language, he did not delve into what kind of speech acts can create institutional facts. Additionally, Searle admits that not all institutional facts are created by constitutive rules (2010, p.23). Therefore, he adds an account of status function declarations and endeavours to argue that institutional facts are “created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same logical form as) S[tatus] F[unction] declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in the explicit form of declarations”(Searle, 2010, p.13). Thus, in order to confirm whether his argument of institutional facts is successful, we have to examine the concept of declarations.

Now we have to examine what declarations and status function declarations mean. Searle states that in declarations, people make something the case by declaring it to be the case. In other words, declarations enable us to create a reality by representing that reality as existing. For instance, a chairperson can adjourn a meeting by a declaration of adjourning the meeting.

Besides, declarations are regarded as a type of five speech acts; (1) assertives (e.g. statements, descriptions, assertions), (2) directives (e.g. orders, commands, requests), (3) commissives (e.g. promises, vows, pledges), (4) expressives (e.g. apologies, thanks, congratulations), and (5) declarations (Searle, 2010, pp.16, 69).

With respect to Searle’s claim on declarations and speech acts, there are three contentions, which will be important to our later discussion. The first is the distinction between the type of state and the content of state. Imagine the following two: “I predict that you will leave the room” and “I order you to leave the room”.  While both cases have the same propositional content “you will leave the room”, they can be classified into the type of assertives and the type of directives respectively (Searle, 2010, p. 28).

The second is that the five modes of speech acts can be distinguished in terms of the ‘world-to-word direction of fit’ and ‘word-to world direction of fit’. The former speech acts purport to represent how things are in the world. For example, an assertive of “The cat is on the mat.” represents things in the world and thus has the world-to-word direction of fit. This kind of proposition can be assessed as true or false. On the other hand, the latter ‘word-to-world direction of fit’ mode of speech acts such as a directives “Leave the room.” or a commissive “I promise.” change things in the world. This word-to-world direction’s speech acts cannot be assessed as true or false. While expressives such as apologies have neither of these directions, notably, declarations have both directions of fit, which he calls the double direction of fit (Searle, 2010, pp.11-12,16,28).

Thirdly, speech acts which have the directions of fit involve ‘conditions of satisfaction’, and a propositional content indicates such conditions. For example, since beliefs can be true or false, they represent their truth conditions. Likewise, desires cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied by being fulfilled or not fulfilled, so desires represent their fulfilment conditions. Conditions of satisfaction indicate these conditions including truth conditions and fulfilment conditions, and such conditions are represented by propositional contents (Searle, 2010, pp.28–9).

From these arguments above,  it can be argued that status function declarations mean declarations which impose status function. According to Searle, we create an institutional fact of status functions by representing them as existing as status function declarations.

Before moving to the next part, this essay provides a distinction of status function declarations, which Searle does not explicitly provide but implicitly argues. We can find such distinction from the following sentences;

With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality [...] is created by speech acts that have the same logical form as Declarations. Not all of them are, strictly speaking, Declarations, because sometimes we just linguistically treat or describe, or refer to, or talk about, or even think about an object in a way that creates a reality by representing that reality as created. These representations have the same double direction of fit as Declarations, but they are not strictly speaking Declarations because there is no Declarational speech act. (Searle, 2010, pp.12–3)

As we have seen, declarations can be seen from the two perspectives: declarations as paralleled with other four types of speech acts and declarations as the double direction of fit. Although both have the double direction of fit, the former explicitly has ‘the same logical form of declarations whereas the latter has ‘no declarational speech act’.  For the sake of clarity, we shall call them the ‘A-type declaration(s)’ and the ‘B-type declaration(s)’ respectively and define that B-type declarations do not include A-type declarations. ^[3]

3. Defence of Searle’s Notion of Declarations

Searle’s social ontology has been criticised from various scholars since his theory covers a wide range of subjects. This part discusses criticisms pertaining to declarations and status function declarations. Although some critics question Searle’s argument about constitutive rules (Epstein, 2015, pp.121–3; Guala, 2016, pp.57–69; Hindriks, 2011, pp.343–5; 2012, pp.104–6; 2013, pp. 379–81; Hindriks and Guala, 2015), they do not focus on the concept of status function declarations. As we discussed, Searle’s theory has changed between his two works, and constitutive rules come to count as a subset of declarations (Searle, 2010, pp.13–4). Therefore, this part focus on criticisms of declarations and status function declarations.

According to Bätge, Göcke, and  Zeuch (2010), speech acts and institutional facts cannot be made without ‘extra-linguistic elements’, but Searle fails to consider it. For instance, in order to make a promise, we need not only saying “I make a promise.” but also reciprocal trust between a speaker and a listener or a belief that both will have rewords, which is an extra-linguistic element. Therefore, a speech act of status function declarations also requires extra-linguistic elements, but Searles’s declarations lack these elements (Bätge, Göcke, and  Zeuch, 2010, pp.187,190-92). However, this criticism regards declarations merely as a form of speech acts, which we call A-type declarations, and does not consider B-type declarations. It can be argued that Searle considers extra-linguistic elements in his argument of  B-type declarations.

Tsohatzidis (2010) points out that declarations might not necessary for the creation of institutional facts. According to Tsohatzidis’s account, Searle defines declaration as a speech act that makes something the case by representing it as being the case and argues institutional facts are created by Decralarions. However, Searl claims that institutional facts are created when a declaration is collectively accepted.^[4] If declarations, in the creation of an institutional fact, need collective acceptance, then it follows that declarations per se are not necessary (Tsohatzidis, 2010). Prien, Skudlarek, Stolte (2010, pp.168-9) also question the relation between collective acceptance and declarations.  

Although it seems plausible to criticise the unclarity of the connection between collective acceptance and declarations, Tsohatzidis also fails to discern the difference between A-type declarations and B-type declarations. More precisely, Tsohatzidis seems to dismiss B-type declarations, and thus he mistakenly deduces the conclusion that declarations do not create institutional facts from the premise that Searle argues that declarations have to be collectively accepted. Taking into account B-type declarations, what Tsohatzidis should conclude from its premise is not that the creation of institutional facts does not require declarations but that the relation between collective acceptance and declarations are ambiguous. [5]

Hindriks (2013) disagrees that status function declarations have a central role in creating institutional facts. He takes status function declarations as a particular speech act performed at a particular time and argues that in the case of the boundary the creation of institutional facts requires the double direction of fit instead of status function declarations (2013, pp. 381–4). This objection, however, would include a problem, because it is not plausible to take status function declarations as a particular action which is performed at a particular moment. Hindriks also takes Searle’s declarations as only A-type declarations. Therefore, Hindriks’s argument that a boundary can be created without a particular speech act would not be a criticism of Searle’s argument.

Secondly, Hindriks might misinterpret the double direction of fit. His paper explains it as follows:

When you make a promise, you are obligated to do as you promised. As this requires action, promises have the world-to-word direction of fit. However, by promising something you also create a fact, the fact of your promise and the obligation involved in it. This implies that promises also have the word-to-world direction of fit. The very making of a promise licenses the belief that a promise has been made and the person who made it is under the obligation to do as promised. (Hindriks, 2013, p. 382)

In this explanation, the word-to-world direction of fit would presume promises which have the world-to-word direction of fit. However, Searle (2010, p. 68) holds, taking an example of promising, that we ‘create a reality by representing that reality as existing’[emphasis added]. In other words, Searle thinks that in making a promise the world-to-word direction of fit is supported by the word-to-world direction of fit. Accordingly, Hindriks seems to misunderstand the concept of the double direction of fit.

We have discussed criticisms pertaining to the concept of declarations. All of these criticisms fail to consider the B-type declarations. This is partly because Searle does not clearly provide a conceptional distinction between the two types of declarations. However, He, though implicitly, draws a line between the two declarations. Hence, it would not be reasonable from these criticisms to conclude that Searle’s theory of institutional facts is wrong.  

4. Problems of Declarations

This part provides criticisms of Searle’s status function declarations from my own point of view and examines whether declarations can actually create institutional facts without any pre-existing institutions. As mentioned, we distinguished between A-type declarations and B-type declarations. Following this distinction, I shall firstly point out the problem of A-type declarations and then criticise both declarations through investigating the double direction of fit.

Consider A-type declarations, which have an explicit form of speech act. Searle argues that in order to make a declaration (A-type declaration), one has to possess a certain position within a convention.

[T]o declare war, adjourn the meeting, or divorce, you need something more than that: you need to be in a special position where an extra-linguistic convention gives you the power to create the corresponding institutional fact. (Searle, 2010, pp 111–2)

However, if A-type declarations require a special position within an extra-linguistic convention, and if Searle thinks that institutions include or amount to conventions, then A-type declarations cannot create a new institutional fact without a convention. In his 1979 book, he has argued that declarations need ‘an extra-linguistic institutions’(Searle, 1979, p.18). Therefore, it is reasonable to think that Searle uses institutions and conventions interchangeably.^[6] Thus, it can be argued that A-type declarations cannot persuasively explain how institutional facts are created without pre-existing institutions.

Therefore, what matters is to examine B-type declaration. Namely, we need to explore whether the double direction of fit, even though not having speech acts in the explicit form of declarations, are able to create institutional facts without any prior institutions. As mentioned, Searle argues that declarations ‘create facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing’(2010, p.69).

Is this explanation compelling? Take an example of a chairperson adjourning a meeting. When he/she declares adjourning the meeting, why can the declaration represent the fact of the end of the meeting before actually adjourning the meeting? In this case, the representation of things in the world (that is, the end of the meeting) would be generated after the declaration of adjourning the meeting. Likewise, when a tribe makes a status function declaration about a line of stones, the representation of the boundary would be produced after the status function declaration. This objection might be related to Hage’s criticism;

If somebody copies the file which contains the text of this paper, his file comes to be identical to mine, and mine comes to be identical to his. However, his copy of the file comes to be identical to my copy in a more basic sense than the other way round, because his copy of the file is adapted to my copy, and not the other way round. Approximately the same holds for the double direction of fit: the words come to fit the world only because the world has been adapted to the words. (Hage, 2011, p. 39)

Namely, declarations might have the world-to-word direction instead of the double direction of fit. 

Whether this objection is reasonable might depend on how we interpret ‘representation’. Searle uses ‘representation’(and ‘represent’) as follows;

Anything that has conditions of satisfaction [...] is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction. (Searle, 2010, p. 30)

and

“Snow is white” [...] assertively represents the state of affairs that snow is white. (Searle, 2010, p. 111)

From these sentences, it is possible to understand that representation denotes a representation of its conditions of satisfaction which its propositional content indicates. Hence, we can understand that declarations mean a ‘representation of conditions of satisfaction’, rather a ‘representation of things in the world’. Depending on this interpretation, the problem mentioned above can be solved. Namely, in the case of a chairperson, the declaration by him/her bring about the end of the meeting (that is, things in the world) through representing the condition of satisfaction, and then the representation of things in the world is produced.

However, it is dubious whether Searle understands representation as such because he asserts declarations ‘create facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing’(2010, p.69). He often takes representation as one of things in the world. Therefore, the objection mentioned above still remains.

As far as representation includes representation of things in the world, Searle’s account of the double direction of fit would not convincing. Therefore, regarding even B-type declarations, status function declarations would not be able to provide cogent reasons that they can create institutional facts without pre-existing institutions.  

Conclusion

As we have argued, Searle claims that institutional facts are created by status function declarations. In order to answer the question of how we can create an institutional fact without preceding institutions, Searle develops his theory by introducing the notion of declaration and status function declarations. According to his account, the double direction of fit can create a new institution out of nothing, and thus this theory can solve the problem in the ad hoc case. This argument can be defended from some criticisms by distinguishing declarations between the two type of declarations. However, his argument that declarations have the double direction of fit is problematic. Therefore, although status function declarations might able to strengthen existing institutional facts, it seems difficult to claim that status function declarations can create institutional facts without pre-existing institutions.  

Bibliography

Bätge, D., Göcke, B. P. and Zeuch, C. (2010). ‘More Than Words Can Say: Searle on the Constitution of Social Facts’, in Franken, Dirk, K., Attila, M., and Michel, J.G., (Eds) John R. Searle: Thinking About the Real World. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 187–198.

Epstein, B. (2015). The ant trap: rebuilding the foundations of the social sciences. New York : Oxford University Press.

Friedman, J. (2006) ‘Comment on Searle’s “Social ontology”’, Anthropological Theory, 6(1), pp. 70–80.

Guala, F. (2016). Understanding Institutions: The Science and Philosophy of Living Together,  Princeton University Press.

Hindriks, F. (2013) ‘Restructuring Searle’s Making the Social World’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences,43(3), pp. 373–389.

Hindriks, F. (2012) ‘But Where Is the University?’, Dialectica, 66(1), pp. 93–113.

Hindriks, F. (2011) ‘Review of Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization, John R. Searle, Oxford University Press, 2010, 224 pages’. Economics and Philosophy, 27(3), pp.338–346.

Hindriks, F. and Guala, F. (2015) ‘Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 11(3), pp. 459–480.

Machery, E. (2014). ‘Social Ontology and the Objection from Reification’, in Gallotti, M., Michael, J. (Eds.), Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 87–100.

Prien, B., Skudlarek, J., Stolte, S.(2010) ‘The Role of Declarations in the Construction of Social Reality’, in Franken, Dirk, K., Attila, M., and Michel, J.G., (Eds) John R. Searle: Thinking About the Real World. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 163-172.

Searle, J. R. (2010) Making the social world: the structure of human civilization. Oxford University Press.

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Searle, J. R. (1995) The Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin Books.

Searle, J. R. (1979) Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, B. (2003) ‘John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social Reality’, in Smith, B. (Ed.), John Searle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–33.

Thomasson, A. L. (2003) ‘Foundations for a Social Ontology’, ProtoSociology, 18, pp. 269–290.

Tsohatzidis, S. L. (2010) ‘Review of John R. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization’. Available at: https://philpapers.org/rec/TSOROJ-2 (Accessed: 1 April 2019).

[1] As far as I read, Searle uses ‘institutional facts’ and ‘institutional reality’ interchangeably, and thus this essay does so.

^[2] The second is provided as ‘freestanding Y terms’ by Barry Smith (2003, p.19). As we discussed, status functions are assigned certain objects or people, but Smith argues that some case does not necessarily elicit physical entity or object (e.g. the creation of corporations and electronic money). The third is the case where institutional facts do not require collective acceptance (Friedman, 2006; Thomasson, 2003).

^[3] Remember that Searle says institutional facts are “created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same logical form as) S[tatus] F[unction] Declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations”(Searle, 2010, p.13). We can understand that ‘representations that have the same logical form as status function declarations’ involve A-type declarations and that B-type declarations denote ones that ‘have not speech acts in the explicit form of declarations’.  

^[4] Searle (2010, p.85) argues ‘[a] person who can get other people to accept this declaration will succeed in creating an institutional reality that did not exist prior to that declaration.’ Tsohatzidis probably points out this sentence.

[5] Tsohatzidis gives another objection regarding status function declarations. While Searle asserts that every institutional fact is created by status function declarations, Tsohatzidis holds that one cannot spend money just by saying "I spend money", cannot go on strike just by saying "I go on strike", cannot obey a military order to attack the enemy just by saying to his/her superior "I obey your order". Tsohatzidis (2010) claims, therefore, that declarations cannot create all institutional facts. However, this objection might be also problematic because these cases would imply examples of commissives which mean ‘to commit the speaker to some course of action’(Searle, 2010, p.59). For that reason, Tsohatzidis’s argument that a speech act of saying “I spend money” cannot create institutional facts would not be an objection to Searle’s theory.

^[6] If Searle regards convention as something different from institutions, then he would have to explain how conventions are created.  

What is ‘neoliberalism’, and how is it related to globalisation?

What is ‘neoliberalism’, and how is it related to globalisation?

In the last three decades, the concept of neoliberalism has become increasingly familiar, but the term has been employed in a nuanced way. Interestingly, ‘there does not seem to be anyone who has written about neoliberalism from a sympathetic or even neutral point of view’, and ‘[p]ractically everyone who writes about neoliberalism does so as part of a critique of neoliberal ideology’ (Thorsen 2010, p.189). Additionally, because of the ambiguity of neoliberalism, the term ‘neoliberal’ and ‘globalisation’ tend to be used interchangeably, and then globalisation per se comes to have a pejorative connotation. However, as Mann (2012 p.3) points out, ‘[g]lobalization in itself cannot be praised or blamed for the state of human society, for it is merely the product of expansions of the sources of social power’. This essay endeavours to distinguish both terms by critically examining the definition of neoliberalism, and investigating the relationship between neoliberalism and globalisation. Firstly, we will examine the definition of neoliberalism provided by David Harvey. We shall draw two contentions from his definition. Concretely, the difference between neoliberalism and classical liberalism as ideologies have to be investigated, and we shall discuss whether neoliberalism has been as dominant in the world as Harvey demonstrated. Secondly, we will argue how neoliberalism is related to globalisation. After discussing some points about globalisation per se, it will be discussed whether neoliberalism has contributed to today’s globalisation in economic, financial, and sociological terms. Finally, this paper will provide a more reasonable conclusion than ones that suggest neoliberalism is the primary driver of globalisation.

Neoliberalism is generally considered as a political and economic ideology or a set of policies supported by such an ideology. From the ideological perspective, neoliberalism tends to be linked to the values of market fundamentalism, individual liberty, laissez-faire. Its origin can be traced to some pioneers; Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek in Britain and Milton Friedman in America respectively are regarded as the fathers of neoliberalism. Additionally, the Mont Pelerin Society and the Chicago School, which was founded and influenced by these thinkers, played a significant role in the proliferation of neoliberalism (Davies 2014, Jones 2012, Mirowski & Plehwe 2009).  Based on this ideology, neoliberal policies generally include privatisation of public sectors, deregulation of financial market, government spending cuts, or elimination of barriers to the flow of goods, services and capital across national borders. These neoliberal policies are generally supposed to have begun with the political leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Davies 2014, Mann 2013). Furthermore, these policies, which are often called ‘Washington Consensus’, are defused from international organisations including the IMF, the WTO or the World Bank, to developing countries (Stiglitz 2002).

David Harvey provides one of the most influential explanations of neoliberalism. He argues that neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that aims to liberate individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills as long as it does not limit private property rights, free markets, and free trade. Therefore, state interventions in markets must be kept to a minimum. He also asserts that since the 1970s neoliberal policies such as deregulation and privatization have been adopted everywhere, and now neoliberalism has become ‘hegemonic as a mode of discourse’ and ‘incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world’ (Harvey 2005, pp.1-4).

Although Harvey’s argument can explain that neoliberalism has corrosive relationships among business, finance capital, and political power, it seems there are two problems. First, his definition cannot distinguish between neoliberalism and classical liberalism (Davies 2014 p.310; Jones 2012, p.14; Mann 2012 p.130). They not only have similarities but also differences, but he would fail to separate them, probably because both liberalisms are the targets of denunciation for Marxists. This is an ideological and philosophical question. Secondly, he argues that neoliberalism has become hegemonic theory and our common sense, but this claim might contain a lot of exaggeration. Although we cannot examine this claim in terms of ideology, we can delve into how far neoliberalism policies are spread across the world. 

Then, we shall begin with the first contention. Classical liberalism, which was established by thinkers like Adam Smith, John Locke, and others, advocates the separation of politics and economics and minimal government intervention in economic affairs and markets in order to secure individual liberty. ^[1] Therefore, classical liberalism is based on the belief in laissez-faire.

On the other hand, there are several differences between classical liberalism and neoliberalism. Firstly, neoliberalism appears to promote laissez-faire as well, but it in fact requires strong state power so as to dismantle trade unions, eliminate economically inefficient regulations, or establish a market in a developing country without it (Centeno & Cohen 2012). As Karl Polanyi (1957) famously points out, there was nothing natural about laissez-faire, and it was artificially created and enforced by the state. In addition, as Foucault claims, ‘[n]eoliberalism should not be therefore identified with laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention’ (Foucault 2008, p.132).

Neoliberalism ostensibly denies state interventions while it elicits powerful states, which can change or liberalise irrational regulations. This apparent contradiction can be resolved by reconsidering the definition of interventions. Neoliberals do not allow states to intervene directly in markets, but a modification of the definition of ‘intervention’ enable neoliberal states to interfere in markets in a different way. As Foucault, referring to Hayek’s interpretation of the Rule of laws, explains:

The economy is a game and the legal institution which frames the economy should be thought of as the rules of the game. The Rule of the law and l’Etat de droit formalize the action of government as a provider of rules for an economic game in which the only players, the only real agents, must be individuals, or let’s say, if you like, enterprises. The general form taken by the institutional framework guaranteed by the state. It is a rule of the economic game and not a purposeful economic-social control. (Foucault 2008, pp.173)

Neoliberal intervention is not ‘a purposeful economic-social control’ but legal interventions. In other words, while neoliberal states do not intervene in markets, they utilize legal power to change rules of the economics by which market is regarded as a game. Such a positive role of state is not provided only by Hayek. Friedman specified that the state must indeed play a positive role:

Neoliberalism would accept the nineteenth century liberal emphasis on the fundamental importance of the individual, but it would substitute for the nineteenth century goal of laissez-faire as a means to this end, the goal of the competitive order … The state would police the system, establish conditions favourable to competition and prevent monopoly, provide a stable monetary framework, and relieve acute misery and distress (Mirowski & Plehwe 2009 p.217, cited in Friedman 1951, pp.91, 93)

From this incite, neoliberalism’s ultimate purpose is nether individual liberty nor laissez-faire. It is to establish ‘the competitive order’ as itself, and thus neoliberals accept legal interventions. These interventions are different from the intervention which classical liberalism assumes.

Secondly, neoliberalism seeks to introduce the principle of market into the outside of markets, such as universities, household, and public administrations (Davies 2014, p.310). Brown (2015), critically referring to Foucault’s thoughts, asserts that neoliberal governing rationality intrudes into democracy and notes that its rationality will undo our democracy. Therefore, she says that ‘[f]ar from Adam Smith’s creature propelled by the natural urge to “truck, barter, and exchange,” today’s homo oeconomicus is an intensely constructed and governed bit of human capital tasked with improving and leveraging its competitive positioning and with enhancing its (monetary and nonmonetary) portfolio value across all of its endeavors and values’ (Brown 2015, p.10). Mirowski (2008, p.114) also claims that ‘[t]he primary ambition of the neoliberal project is to redefine the shape and functions of the state’. In sum, neoliberalism does not aim to separate the political and the economic like classical liberalism but to replace the political with the economic. For this reason, privatizations, which intend to transfer business, industry, or service from public to private control, are facilitated by neoliberalism.

The third point is that neoliberalism tends to be optimistic about dominance by corporations. This is involved with the argument, as we have seen above, that neoliberalism places huge value on competition as itself. Mann (2012 p.147) contends that ‘neoliberals departs from classical liberals to argue that the bigger the cooperation, the greater its efficiency and the better the service offered to consumers’. Crouch (2011) explains neoliberals appear to problematize monopoly because it stifles competition, but they insist that competition would endure even if there were only three giant firms in any economic sector. Such an optimistic attitude might come from ‘the contemporary “economization” of subjects by neoliberal rationality’ (Brown 2014 p.33). According to Brown, neoliberalism not only alters the relation between the politic and the economic but also economise, or to be exact financialize human beings per se. Thus, neoliberal homo oeconomicus is considered as human capital struggling to enhance its competitive positioning and appreciate its value. Additionally, ‘[a]s neoliberal rationality remakes the human being as human capital, an earlier rendering of homo oeconomicus as an interest maximizer gives way to a formulation of the subject as both a member of a firm and as itself a firm, and in both cases as appropriated conducted by the governance practices appropriate to firms’ (Ibid, p.34). In other words, the principle of business, especially financial business, penetrates into human being.

Now we shall move to the second contention drawn from Harvey’s argument. As we have seen, Harvey argues that neoliberalism now has become hegemonic and consisted of our common sense. We should examine his claim because, as is often pointed out, most definitions of neoliberalism are provided by its critics and has pejorative connotations (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009; Jessop 2013; Davies 2014; Thorsen 2010). Of course, we cannot empirically examine whether neoliberalism as an ideology has had dominant power or not, so we shall investigate neoliberal policies ‘‘freeing up commodity markets and international capital flows, deregulating labor markets, balancing state budgets, and generally reducing state intervention in the economy’ (Mann 2012, p.130).

Mann (2012) doubts Harvey’s argument and contends that neoliberalism has been diffused less broadly than other scholars have expected. Mann deals with the advanced countries in terms of classification into three types, the Anglophone, Nordic, and continental Europe, basically following the Esping-Andersen’s distinction of welfare state. It is true, Mann says, that the Anglos readily adopted neoliberal policies including cutting back the labour unions, selling off nationalised industries, or reducing taxes, because the Anglos had liberal traditions of classical economics and moral individualism. However, in most other countries, neoliberalism made lesser progress. For instance, neoliberalism in continental Europe was muted by the post-war Christian Democrat or Social Democrat compromise. Thus, its mild neoliberalism, ‘ordo-liberalism’, or the social market was pragmatic and required state protection. The Nordics also accepted some neoliberal policies, but its influence was limited because of corporatist social democracy. Such a limited neoliberal influence can be seen from increasing economic inequality. Although some neoliberal policies like government spending cuts were adopted in some countries in both continental Euro and Nordic, these countries took these policies not because of neoliberalism but because of domestic financial pressure. From the 1970s, inequality widened most among the Anglos, particularly in the US. Although it increased even in some European countries, their collective Gini changed very little. Thus, Mann concludes that neoliberalism had risen almost everywhere but in only some Anglophone countries has it become dominant. Besides, regarding Harvey, Mann claims:

Though Harvey is correct that the period of greatest neoliberal power saw redistribution toward the highest social classes, this was not quite universal. Most Anglophone scholars (who dominate these debates) tend to think their local experience is typical of the world. It is not – at least not yet. (Mann 2012, p.163)

This criticism seems compelling, but as Mann notes, it seems that we should say the dominance of neoliberalism is ‘at least not yet’.  In spite of his own caveat, Mann would underestimate the influence of neoliberalism. Streek points out as follows:

We tend to underestimate how long societal causes take to produce their effects. If we ask too soon whether or not a theory concerning the change or end of a social formation is accurate, we run the risk of seeing it refuted before it has had a chance to prove it. … [T]he solidly established, inert institutions such as European welfare states could not have been expected disappear, or to become something fundamentally different, after just a few years of economic internationalization. (Streek 2014, pp. xii-xiii)

Besides, Mann asserts that ‘[n]eoliberalism’s rise was not global outside the financial sector’ (Mann 2012 p.148). However, reforms in the financial sector are not a peripheral issue for neoliberals, rather central one. Therefore, even only in the financial sector, the impact of neoliberalism ‘could’ expand broadly. In other words, Mann’s argument would be too confined to welfare policies.

Thus, returning to Harvey’s argument, we cannot follow it because it seems be an exaggeration to say that neoliberalism ‘has’ become hegemonic or dominant in the world. As Mann points out, although neoliberalism has diffused, especially in the Anglophones, it is not to say that neoliberalism has been fully accepted even in other countries. Neoliberalism has varied according to each domestic affairs or institutions. However, at the same time, it does not mean the other countries have ‘rejected’ neoliberalism. Therefore, it might be possible that neoliberalism will have become hegemonic and our common sense in the future.

To summarise the discussion so far, neoliberalism can be defined an ideology which aims to establish the competitive order and includes both explicit economic laissez-faire and implicit legal interventions, the replacement of the political with the economic, and the economisation of subjects. This ideology supports various neoliberal policies: privatisation of public sectors, deregulation of financial sectors, government spending cuts, dismantlement of trade unions, and elimination of barriers to the flow of goods, services and capital across national borders. Moreover, the discourse that neoliberalism has become a dominant ideology should be taken with a grain of salt, because neoliberal policies have not been accepted for what they are in the U.K. or the U.S.

Before delving into how neoliberalism is related to globalisation, we should briefly discuss globalisation. Firstly, many economists identify globalisation as a global integration of markets and consider it as an economic and financial phenomenon in which flows of trade, capital, people, and information increase. This is partly true, but this paper does not deal with globalisation as only an economic phenomenon. Secondly, some scholars argue globalisation leads to a single world society (e.g. Albrow 1996). However, this argument is far from reality. Instead, from the sociological aspect, globalisation denotes the ‘tendencies to a world-wide reach, impact, or connectedness of social phenomena or to a world-encompassing awareness among social actors’ (Therborn 2000, p.154), or ‘the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of international flows and patterns of social interaction’ (Held & McGrew 2003, p.4). In other words, globalisation enhances interconnectedness between societies, but it does not mean to create a single society. Thirdly, concerning the political aspect, some argue that globalisation weaken the nation-state system (e.g. Ohmae 1995), but as Mann asserts (2012, pp.8-10), ‘the nation-state and globalization have not been rivals in a zero-sum game with one undermining the other’, and states have still significant roles even in the process of globalisation. Thus, this paper does not accept the argument that political globalisation, which could lead to a ‘cosmopolitan democracy’(Held 1995), is occurring. Finally, globalisation is neither a recent, unique, nor an irreversible phenomenon (Therborn 2000; O’Byrne & Hensby 2011, p.12; Osterhammel and Petersson 2005). Therefore, we should pluralise globalisation and deal with globalisations (Mann 2012, Therborn 2000). This argument indicates that globalisation does not necessarily elicit neoliberalism, because some globalisations emerged without neoliberalism. Accordingly, neoliberalism is not a necessary condition for globalisation.

Thus, in what follows, we shall confine globalisation to the one in the post-war period and examine how neoliberalism is related to globalisation in economic, financial, and sociological terms. Specifically, it will be argued whether neoliberalism contributed to an increase in the flows of trade and foreign investment and whether neoliberalism strengthened interconnectedness in the world.

After World War II, the Keynesian regime was established as an international regime. Regarding trades, the GATT reduced the trade barriers, especially tariffs, and the share of external trade, which had declined during the war, began to recover (Therborn 2000, p.162). This regime experienced the golden age and contributed to globalisation, but the establishment of the GATT and other policies formulated in this term was not based on neoliberalism. For this reason, neoliberalism is not the direct cause of economic globalisation. In the 1970s, facing stagflation and the oil shocks, the Keynesian regime collapsed, and neoliberalism opened the door. According to Cohen and Centeno (2006), although neoliberal policies decreased tariff levels (both export and import duties), trade intensity (the total value of imports and exports relative to GDP) in 96 countries did not demonstrate an evident change until 1993. The rise after the year was generally not dramatic, so it is difficult to say that neoliberalism directly and substantially propelled economic globalisation.

Financial globalisation is one of the most conspicuous features in today’s globalisation. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was shifted to the floating rate system, and this shift arranged the environment where capital easily flowed beyond national borders. While some neoliberal domestic policies in the 1980s such as privatisation or dismantlement of trade unions might not have a direct relationship to globalisation, financial liberalisation is supposed to promote globalisation. In both the U.K. and the U.S., neoliberal governments swept away many financial restrictions and increased capital mobility. For instance, Thatcher initiated the Big Bang, a radical deregulation of the stock market, allowing the merging of commercial and investment banks, and opening it up to foreign capital flow (Mann 2012, p.143). Besides, according to Stiglitz (2002), the foundation of the World Bank and IMF was based on a Keynesian recognition, but by the beginning of the 1980s, both organisations began to follow the neoliberal turn of Reagan and Thatcher, shifting their rationale away from urging global economic stability towards that capital market liberalisation. Consequently, we can find the empirical data demonstrating that the amount of foreign direct investment gradually increased until the middle of the 1980s and rapidly accelerated during the 1990s, especially in the OECD (Cohen and Centeno 2006, p.52). Thus, neoliberalism has stimulated financial globalisation.  

Some claim that neoliberalism is the central element that drives present globalisation.[2] For example, Litonjua (2008) argues ‘that globalisation is the global spread of the economic system of capitalism. Promoted by the ideology of neoliberalism, the goal is a wholly deregulated global market’. This view could conclude that neoliberalism drove globalisation to a great extent. As we have argued, however, globalisation cannot be confined to economic and financial factors. For this reason, we have to look at the sociological aspect of globalisation.

What kind of factors does cause and facilitate the globalisation in a sociological sense? Economic elements can also enhance a world-encompassing awareness or patterns of social interaction but telecommunication technology and transportation infrastructure play more crucial roles in globalisation. For example, satellite broadcasting produced in the 1980s has globally diffused information (Therborn 2000, pp.163-4). The development of naval travel and jet travel has been crucial in developing means of transport of both people and goods, and the advent of the Internet has enabled people to fetch information in the world (Martell 2010, pp.67-84). These developments have been shrinking time and geographical space and have fostered the awareness of growing interconnectedness. However, no empirical data is indicating that neoliberalism causes or encourages these developments. Thus, we cannot claim that neoliberalism has a relationship to the globalisation in a sociological sense.

In conclusion, neoliberalism is partly related to globalisation. It is difficult to say that the neoliberal economic policies, which eliminate tariff barriers, promote economic globalisation. Moreover, because the increase in trades can be seen before the 1970s, we cannot say that neoliberalism is the direct cause of current globalisation. On the other hand, we can discover that financial liberalisation underpinned by neoliberalism has increased the volatility of capital flows beyond national borders and encouraged financial globalisation. Additionally, considering history, since globalisations can occur without neoliberalism, neoliberalism is not a necessary condition for globalisations. Globalisations are complicated and polymorphic phenomena. The first half part of this essay discussed neoliberalism per se. Harvey’s argument might emphasise too much the impact of neoliberalism. Importantly, through examining the differences between neoliberalism and classical liberalism, we have defined neoliberalism is a political and economic ideology which aims to establish the competitive order and includes both explicit economic laissez-faire and implicit legal interventions, the replacement of the political with the economic, and the economisation of subjects. Neoliberal policies are derived from this ideology. Many scholars have shed light on only the economic aspects of neoliberalism, but this definition’s focus moves toward political aspects. Additionally, we have to re-emphasise that neoliberalism ultimately aims to foster competition as itself and that it, consciously or unconsciously, allows legal interventions. This definition might be too abstract, but it could provide an instructive perspective when examining the current tension between democracy and capitalism.

References

• Albrow, M. (1996) The global age : state and society beyond modernity. Cambridge Polity Press.
• Wikan, V.S. (2015) ‘Neoliberalism’, and How Does It Relate to Globalization? , viewed 2 December 2018, <https://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/21/what-is-neoliberalism-and-how-does-it-relate-to-globalization/>
• Boas, T. and Gans-Morse, J. (2009) ‘Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan’, Studies in Comparative International Development. New York, 44(2), pp. 137–161.
• Brown, W. (2015) Undoing the demos neoliberalism’s stealth revolution. New York; Zone Books.
• Centeno, M. A. and Cohen, J. N. (2012) ‘The Arc of Neoliberalism’, Annual Review of Sociology, 38(1), pp. 317–340.
• Cohen, J. N. and Centeno, M. A. (2006) ‘Neoliberalism and Patterns of Economic Performance, 1980-2000’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 32–67.
• Crouch, C. (2011) The strange non-death of neoliberalism. Cambridge.
• Davies, W. (2014) ‘Neoliberalism: A Bibliographic Review’, Theory, Culture & Society, 31(7–8), pp. 309–317.
• Foucault, M. (2008) The birth of biopolitics lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79. Edited by G. Burchell et al. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Friedman, Milton (1951) ‘Neo-Liberalism and its Prospects’ Farmand, 17 February, pp. 89-93
• Harvey, D. (2005) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the global order : from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance. Cambridge: Polity.
• Held, D. and McGrew, A. G. (2003) The global transformations reader : an introduction to the globalization debate. Second edi. Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Jessop, B. (2013) ‘Putting neoliberalism in its time and place: a response to the debate’, Social Anthropology. Oxford, UK, 21(1), pp. 65–74.
• Jones, D. S. (2012) Masters of the universe Hayek, Friedman, and the birth of neoliberal politics. Princeton,
• Kotz, D. M. (2002) ‘Globalization and Neoliberalism’, Rethinking Marxism. Taylor & Francis Group, 14(2), pp. 64–79.
• Litonjua, M. D. (2008) ‘The Socio-Political Construction of Globalization’, International Review of Modern Sociology. International Journals, 34(2), pp. 253–278.
• Mann, M. (2012) The Sources of Social Power: Volume 4: Globalizations, 1945–2011. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Martell, L. (2010) The sociology of globalization.
• Mirowski, P. (2008) ‘A Brief History of Neoliberalism’, Economics and Philosophy, pp. 111–117.
• Mirowski, P. and Plehwe, D. (2009) The road from Mont Pèlerin : the making of the neoliberal thought collective. Cambridge, Mass.
• O’Byrne, D. J. and Hensby, A. (2011) Theorizing global studies. Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan.
• Ohmae, K. (1995) The end of the nation state : the rise of regional economies. London : HarperCollins.
• Osterhammel, J. and Petersson, N.P.(2005) Globalization : a short history. Princeton, N.J. .
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• Stiglitz, J. E. (2002) Globalization and its discontents. London: Penguin.
• Streeck, W. (2014) Buying time : the delayed crisis of democratic capitalism. Brooklyn, NY : Verso.
• Thorsen, D.E.. (2010). ‘The neoliberal challenge: what is neoliberalism?’, Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice. 2. 188-214.

[1] Some distinguish classical liberalism between political meaning and economic one, but this paper does not do so because neoliberalism also includes both political and economic aspects.

[2]  By contrast, Wikan (2015) argues that there is no relationship between neoliberalism and globalisation. She contends, after distinguishing between neoliberalism, economic liberalism, and neoliberal institutionalism, that many policies which are generally assumed to be based on neoliberalism are  supported by economic liberalism or neoliberal institutionalism (or opportunism). However, there are some problems in her argument. Firstly, her definition of neoliberalism seems too narrow. She also admits this point. Secondly, she arbitrarily categorises some policies into economic liberalism or neoliberal institutionalism. In her argument, if policies, albeit including neoliberal substances, are not formulated under the name of neoliberalism, then they fall out of neoliberalism. For instance, she argues that because Thatcher’s government did not demonstrate evidence of adhering to neoliberalism, her policies were not neoliberalism. However, if this logic would be valid, there would be almost no neoliberal policies because the term neoliberalism has been used almost exclusively by its critics. We should investigate not whether policymakers use the term neoliberalism but whether the substance of policy is underpinned by neoliberal ideology. Therefore, it would be difficult to conclude that neoliberalism is not related to globalisation.

カールトンヒル

良い街には象徴がある。出来事、風景、食に人物。そこに人が集い、衣食住という営みを継続的に行う空間ならば、その街を凝縮し表象するような象徴が生まれてくる。エッフェル塔を見ればそこにはパリの街が広がっているとわかるし、ビッグベンを見ればそこはロンドンだと解釈する。象徴は単にその事物のみを見せるのではなく、それ以上の何かを見る者に伝える。想像力を掻き立てる。

もちろん象徴にも善悪や美醜がある。何かを集約するとき、そこからこぼれ落ちるものがあるのは避けられない。あるいは、どこかの権力者や組織が「これだ」と宣言することで、不自然に耳目を集め、愚物が象徴へと化すこともある。無理に何かを観光地化させたがるケースはこのタイプになりやすい。一時的な流行に終わる象徴も多い。

しかし一方で、いい意味で人を惹きつける象徴も間違いなく存在する。歴史の熟成を経て、その象徴の美的魅力や出来事の真実性に根ざし、自然とかつ次第に人々の集合的な意識が向けられるところに生成する、正しい意味でのシンボリックな何かが存在する。

象徴を語ることは、象徴を再び形成し維持することにつながる。裏を返せば、語ることをやめれば象徴はすぐに消失する。象徴は自然物のように、人間の営みから独立して存在する何かではない。

さらに言えば、いい象徴は我々に自らを語らしめる。放っておいてもその美しさ（あるいは悲惨さ）ゆえに誰かがもてはやす。だからこそ時の試練に耐えうる象徴は、世代を超えて人々を魅了し続け、言葉を紡がせ、また象徴としての地位を再度確保する。これも象徴の魅力であるように思われる。

カールトンヒルへ初めて行ったのは、エディンバラに着いた翌々日だった。寮のイベントで、ツアーと題されたものに参加した。ツアーとは言っても、寮から徒歩十分程度である。そんな近くにあるのにも関わらず、三十人ほどの参加者がレジデントアシスタントという寮に住む博士課程の学生に率いられる。今考えると幼稚園児の遠足のようだった。だが到着したばかりのこの街に関しては、さながら幼稚園児ほどしか知らなかったのだから、あながち間違った表現でもないと思う。

初めてこの丘に向かった時は、湿気含みの生ぬるい風が吹いていて、通り過ぎる観光客の聞きなれない言葉に耳をそばだてたりしていた。

10 Sep, 2018　Calton Hill

丘からエディンバラの街並みを初めて眺めたときは、なんとも「贅沢な風景」だと感じた。そしてこの風景こそ、自分がこの街に来ることを選んだ理由そのものだった。それまで写真や書物、映像の中の世界でしか存在しなかったものが、生きた現実として自分の地平に現れた感動は忘れがたい。視界から途切れることなく続く悠揚たる物腰の街並みに心が躍った。同時に、向こう一年何度もここに足を運ぶだろうという気がした。

漱石は『倫敦塔』で、観光地へは二度三度と足を運ぶものではない、などと書いていた。確かに観光地に関してはそうかもしれない。しかし私は観光でここへきているのではない。私にとってこの丘は非日常の体験のための場ではなく、自らが住まうことになる土地の一部である。出たくなったら出られるような場所ではない。向き合わねばならない場所である。

どこかに住むとはその土地の習慣に身を埋めることでもある。英語で「住民」は inhabitant であるが,　文字通りそれは習慣(habit)の中(in)に参入することを意味する。観光ではなく留学で来ている以上、私はこの土地の inhabitant になることを望んだ。どこか習慣的に通い、自分の定点となる場所を持ちたかった。もっとも習慣らしい習慣、すなわち象徴にこの身を埋め込みたかった。それがここカールトンヒルだった。

この街での体験が増えるほど、この丘からの景色は違ったものになっていった。視界に映る建物一つ一つに自己の体験としての物語が積み上がり、ただの物体が「意味」を持つ。意味を持った建物や場所という「部分」が、また街という「全体」へと還元される。街を知ることは部分と全体の解釈学的循環だと、改めて感じた。

Edinburgh Castle

街の中心に屹立している建物がエディンバラ城である。巨大な岩の上に据えられたこの城の美しさは、城の中へ入って展示物をどれだけ見てもわかるものではない。城などは一介の市民が内に入って下界を見下ろすためのものではない。過去のこの街の市民はそんなことをしなかっただろう。どこからでもよいが、街という此岸から城という彼岸を見上げるべきものだと、個人的には思う。旧市街からせり出した巨岩の上に乗る堅塞固塁のようなこの城は、街の崇高美の象徴である

Scott Monument

城の近くに見えた黒ずんだ塔はウォルター・スコットのモニュメントだと、近くを歩いたときに知った。スコットの銅像は街の至る所にある。駅の名前が「Edinburgh Station」ではなく「Waverley Station」と、スコットの小説から取られているところに、この街で彼がいかに愛されているのかを知ることができる。またアダム・スミスやデビッド・ヒュームといった数多いるスコットランド人の俊傑の中で、このロマン派の文人に最高の象徴性が与えられていることに、彼らがいかに言語や物語を重んじる民族かという推測をすることもできる。人文知への敬意を常識的に抱いている彼らの精神文化は、過剰な効率性やら合理性が称賛される空気を吸って育った自分にとって、ある種の解毒作用のような効果があった。

丘の上にある円形の石碑はスコットランド啓蒙の担い手デュガルト・ステュワートのものである。約三百年前、エディンバラを揺籃の地として発展したこの啓蒙思想は、賢しらな合理主義にとらわれないもう一つの啓蒙であった。資本主義の胎動とともに経済的利己心がはびこる中、そこに社交や共感の道徳哲学を提示した彼らの思想が、今日のスコットランド人の気前良さ、人の良さと無縁であるとは考え難い。パブで聞こえてくるスコットランド英語を終始理解できずにいた自分ともベルヘイブンを飲んでくれた彼らと話していると、そんな古層があるのではないかと思わざるを得なかった。彼らと話していると、パブで出されるビールの生ぬるさもなんとか許す気になれた。

David Hume, スコットランド啓蒙を担った哲学者の一人

丘から見える王冠を被せたような建物が、セントジャイルズ大聖堂である。churchとcathedral の違いも分からないほどキリスト教文化に疎い私に、その美的魅力を初めて教えてくれたのはここだった。中に入ると、巨大なステンドグラスから取り込まれた光は幻想的な心地よさを与え、アーチ状に広がる天井が人間存在の卑小さを痛覚させる。椅子に座って深くため息をつきながら、この聖堂の荘厳さに魅了されていたことを思い出す。さらに言えば「ゴシック」という言葉に手触りを与えてくれたのもこの場所だった。自分にとって観念でしかない文言が、生の体験を通して実感のある言葉になるとき、異国の体験が体験としての価値を持つ。キリスト教という私にとっての「他者」との生きた対話の場が、セントジャイルズ大聖堂であった。

St. Giles' Cathedral

中心に見える時計台は、J・K・ローリングがハリー・ポッターの最終巻を書くために使ったバルモラルというホテルだと誰かから聞いた。「賢者の石」を書いていたという市内のカフェが、今では観光地になって、ゆっくりとコーヒーも味わえないのはいただけないが、新しい象徴であればそれも仕方がない。当時ローリングは貧乏暮らしで、エディンバラに住む妹だか姉だかを訪ねてきたのだという。なるほどホグワーツはエディンバラ城にそっくりであるし、作中に登場する人物名が近くの墓地に眠る人々から取られている。おまけにディメンターはエディンバラの鬱屈した空気がローリングにインスピレーションを与えたとも言われているが、霧に包まれた旧市街を見たとき、さもありなんと思った。この街の歴史的豊かさは現代の物書き達にとっての想像力と創造力の源泉でもある。

The Balmoral

街から少し外れた木立にはディーンヴィレッジがある。中心街にはない田舎っぽさをもつこの風景もまたエディンバラの一部である。田舎風ではあるが瀟洒な建物が、ここを風光明媚な場所として際立たせている。閑静な住宅街の中に流れる川の音と鳥の囀りに耳を済ませていれば、一時間などあっという間に過ぎる。初めて訪れたときは、茶褐色の川の色に思わず不潔だと感じてしまったのだが、後にそれは泥炭が染み出た色なのだと知った。スコッチの琥珀色の源泉だと知れば、それも愛でずにはいられなくなる。再度訪れたときはこの川の色も含めて、やはり美しいと感じた。

Dean Village

丘から見えない他の場所にも魅力があるが、到底書き切れるものではない。いずれにせよ私はこの丘から見えたもののある場所へ足を運び、それらをまたこの丘から確認していた。カールトンヒルへ来るたびに街を知り、街を知るたびにカールトンヒルへ来たくなった。

八月三十日、エディンバラを離れる前日もやはりここに来た。この国にしては十分晴れた、涼風が心地良い日だった。振り返ると、最初に来たときに「贅沢だ」と感じたのは正しかったのだと思う。

過去が現在へと入り混じるのがエディンバラである。歴史を生きたすべての住民の余薫の上に、今の住民の自由と秩序を成り立たせているのがエディンバラである。そんな魅力を聞きつけて訪れる人々を受け入れているのがエディンバラである。未だ明らかになっていない悲劇や負の歴史を抱えているのもエディンバラである。

古都ならではの時間と空間の圧縮。それが最初にこの街を眺めた私に、容易には味わい切れぬこの土地の豊饒さを示していた。それが私に贅沢だと感じさせたものの正体だったのだと思う。カールトンヒルは、エディンバラにおける象徴の数々を一望できる場所であり、エディンバラの象徴そのものである。

14 April, 2019　早朝のCalton Hill

10 Aug, 2019　夜のCalton Hill

修論

今月上旬に無事修論を提出した。この一年の集大成である修論を書き上げるまでの過程を少し振り返って記録しておきたい。

三月

授業がまだ続く。月末に修論のタイトルと要約（100 Words）、および論文内容にかかわるキーワードを4～5個書いた簡単な修論計画を提出する。おそらくこれを見てその分野に適した指導教官（Superviser）が割り当てられることになる。こちらの大学院(taughtコース)は日本のように大学院入学時点から研究室に割り当てられるようなシステムではない。そのため、9－12月の一学期と1－3月までの二学期は授業（ディスカッション形式）ばかりである。その間修論に向けて何かするわけでもない。授業内容が上手く修論内容と重なれば授業に注力することが修論につながるのだが、私の場合はそうではない。

むしろこの半年はやりたくもないことをやることが多かった。大学および所属プログラムの下調べが甘かった部分は全くもって自分の責任である。だが取ろうとしていた授業が無くなっていたり、授業内容も担当教授の関心に限定されていたりと、大学側への不満もある。Feminism論やEnvironmental Studies など流行りの講義があまりにも多く、日本で言うところの「政治哲学」に近い授業は皆無であった。イライラしながらもなんとか授業をこなしていったのが九月から三月までの時期だった。

もちろん面白い授業もあった。半年で受けた六つの授業のうち、興味深かったのは前期のNationalismと後期の社会哲学（授業名は ”Explanation and Understanding in Social and Political Research”）だろうか。前者はナショナリズム論の基本的論争、理論家の紹介が主な内容である。アンダーソンやゲルナー、アンソニー・スミスはもちろん、マイケル・マンやグリーンフェルド、ロジャー・ブルーベイカーらの近年の理論家も扱う。これほど包括的かつ理論的にナショナリズムを概観できる授業は、日本ではまずない。イギリスというよりもエディンバラだからこその授業であり、終始関心が尽きなかった。後者は、授業名から社会科学の方法論的なものを予想していたのだが、内容はそれを大きく超えていた。そもそも社会とはなにか（社会存在論）や、制度あるいは貨幣とは何かという社会哲学上の問題を扱う授業であった。「社会は如何様に存在しているのか」という問いを、単なる「研究手法」や「立場」の問題で済まさず、哲学的に問う理論家の議論を検討する。一昔前のアメリカ政治学の影響が強い日本では、自然科学的アプローチを援用して社会科学的問いを探求するのが主流だが、ここではもはやそれも時代遅れになっているようである。社会を利己的個人の機械的集合体としか見ない「社会科学」に学部生の頃から辟易していた私からすれば、この授業は非常に魅力的であった。

だが政治理論・政治哲学を学ぶためにこの大学へ来た以上、そちらのテーマで修論をやりたかった。迷いに迷った挙句、とりあえずH.Gガダマーをやろうと決めた。以前から気になっていた哲学者であり、昨年末ドイツを旅行してハイデルベルクを訪ねたときには、ガダマーの墓へ参った。以来ガダマーへの興味が膨れ、どうせなら全力で取り組めるうちにやっておきたいと思い、無謀を承知で修論計画書を提出した。

四月

第三週あたりまでで、後期の授業のエッセイをすべて提出した。全部で10000 wordsぐらいだったと思う。これですべての授業を終了させた。残すは文字通り修論のみとなった。

同じぐらいのタイミングで指導教官が決まった。今年の1月からエディンバラ大学でLecturer（講師）としてカナダから赴任してきた人あった。つまり博論を書いてPh.Dを得たばかりの人である。年齢もそれほど私と変わらない。心配になったのは、私の修論テーマの分野に関してはほとんど知らないのではないかということである。英米のリベラル系の人であればなおさら実践哲学の系譜に当たる、しかも大陸系の哲学者であるガダマーなどには関心を持たないであろう。もちろんガダマーに詳しい人など最初から期待していないが、せめてリベラリズム批判に通じている人であることを期待していた。

そんな懸念を抱えつつ、四月末に面談をした。面談では現時点での修論構想を議論する。"Gadamer's conservatism"という仮タイトルで、おおよその計画を話す。ガダマーの解釈学をバークらに連なる保守主義として解釈し再構築するのが目的だと伝えた。しかし案の定その指導教官はガダマーの名前すら知らない様子である。バークやオークショットの名前を出してようやくピンときた様子だった。仕舞いには「conservatismやHermeneuticsに関してはよくわからないから、他の教授にアポ取って話を聞きに行ったほうがいい」と言われてしまう。

言われた通りにHermeneuticsに詳しいと紹介された講師にメールを送ったところ、「Feminisimの観点からのHermeneutics には精通しているが、Gadamerに精通しているわけではない」と言われ、結局Hermeneuticsに関わる論文をいくつかメール上で紹介してもらうに留まった。

昨年九月以来徐々に蓄積されてきた不満が、この時ピークに達した。指導教官に対してではなく、この大学、あるいは学界に対してである。少なくともこの大学の（そしておそらく英米系の）政治哲学関連のアカデミアでは、もはやリベラリズムやコスモポリタニズムといった「主流派」と流行の分野以外の受け皿がないのではないか。これは個人の思想信条の問題ではない。教官がどんな思想を持っているかはどうでもよい。そうではなく、一研究者であるにもかかわらず、「非主流派」の思想は存在すらしていないかの如くネグレクトしている、その態度に疑念を禁じ得ない。

指導教官からもその他の教授からも、構成などの表面的な部分以外で有益なアドバイスはほとんど何ももらえないと分かった。当然周囲の学生で私のようなテーマを選んでいる人もいない。自分一人でこの修論と向き合わなければならないと悟った。

五月

修論執筆の時期に入った。提出期限は8月8日。しかしこのとき私は軽いうつ状態だったと思う。もともと親しく話す友人も数人しかおらず、さらに授業が無くなったことで人と会う機会が減っていた。加えて一人で修論に取り組まなければならないという重圧が、絶えず私を憂鬱な気分にし続けた。

次第に論文も文献も読む気がしなくなっていった。第二・三週は一本も論文を読めず、ただ家に引き籠っていた。映画やドラマを見ては無為に一日が終わる生活だった。一日中ベッドから出られなかった日もあった。何も出来なかったというその日の罪悪感が、次の日の活力を奪い、じわじわと深みに落ちていくような日々だった。

五月も終わりそうなあたりで自分の異変に自覚的になった。もともと海外で生活するにあたって精神状態に注意するようには心掛けてきたので、精神の衰弱はこういうものかとも思った。

そこからはできるだけ体を動かしたり、人と話したり、外に出歩くようにした。

次第に修論に対するやる気を取り戻した。四面楚歌の状態におかれたことで、むしろ一人ですべてやり通してやろうという不退転の決意を持つに至った。

六月

おおよその章・節の構成が定まり、そこからはひたすら文献を読みつつ書き続けた。修論の字数は15000 words だったが、六月末時点で5000 wordsぐらいだったと思う。

気概はあっても容易に進められないのが、母国語以外で論文を書くことの大変さなのかもしれない。

論の骨子を考えていくのは日本語でも英語でも変わらないため、大きな構成を考えるのはそれほど難しいことではない。だがそこに表現という肉付けをする作業は、やはり一筋縄ではいかない。ひたすら内容と表現を同時に推敲しながら少しずつ論を進めていった。

 七月

七月に入った段階で指導教官から進捗を伺うメールが来た。同時に、「conservatismに詳しい講師が移ってくるから、アポ取って議論してくるといい」という話を聞き、早速その講師に連絡した。

しかし「サバティカル（長期休暇）のためエディンバラに戻ってくるのは八月になる」との自動返信が届く。

どうやら最後まで一人でやらなければならないらしいと悟った。結局この講師からは八月に入って返信が届き、conservatism 関連の文献をいくつか紹介してもらうにとどまった。最終的に指導教官との最初の面談以外、アドバイスらしいアドバイスは受けられなかった。

七月末の時点で初稿が完成した。一通り書けると一気に肩の荷が下りた。私のような日本人にとって英語論文は「締め切り前の追い上げ」などで慌てて書こうとしても書けるものではない。その意味で字数一杯で論じ切った時点でかなりの安心感があった。

八月

気分が楽になったと同時にエディンバラには祭囃子が鳴り響く。毎年８月は世界規模の大きさを誇るFringeという芸術祭がこの街で開かれる。ミュージカル、マジック、演劇にコメディ。この一か月間、様々なジャンルの芸術が街のいたるところで見られる。大学のキャンパスにも舞台やビアホールが設置される。初稿ができていなければ地獄だった。

構成段階でかなり時間をかけたので、特に大きな議論の修正をすることもなかった。第四稿ができた時点で満足したので、締切一日前に無事提出した。

現在は採点中である。こちらの大学院では、修論も授業と同様の基準で点数が付けられる。評価が悪くなければ、無事修士課程を終えて修士号を取得できる。あと数日で寮を出て、イングランドに少し滞在したのち帰国する予定である。

修論執筆中の自室

追記

九月

無事論文の採点が終わった。評価も「優」に当たる評価だったのでホッとした。イギリスの修論では匿名の採点者(聞くところ学外の人間)二人からコメントがつく。そのうちの一人は、評価文から推測するにガダマーに通じている人だが、かなり評価してくれた。誰にも解されないと思って書いた修論だっただけに、点数以上の嬉しさと達成感があった。

ターナー展で考えたこと ー二つの崇高論ー

ターナー展へ

 　二～三年ほど前から美術館に、とりわけ絵画を観に行くようになった。最初は大学での研究に若干関わるだろうぐらいの気持ちで行っていたのだが、最近では純粋に好きで観に行くようになった。とはいえ観ていてもまだまだ何が何やらさっぱり、ということが大半。こればかりはできる限り良いものに触れる機会を増やすしかないのだと思う。

 先日は、京都文化博物館で開催中のターナー展に行ってきた。

 　ターナーについての説明は以下の通り。

 ジョゼフ・マロード・ウィリアム・ターナー（1775－1851）は、イギリスで最も偉大な画家であるのみならず、風景画の歴史のなかで最も独創的な画家のひとりです。卓越した技法によって、嵐の海景、崇高な山、穏やかな田園風景など、自然の多様な表情を描くとともに、歴史風景画にも取り組みました。光と空気に包まれた革新的な風景表現は、今日においても多くの芸術家にとって、インスピレーションの源になっています。（上記ページより引用）

　それほど多くの画家を知るわけではないが、ターナーは好きな画家の一人である。第一に「入りやすい」ということ。ロマン主義の時代を生きたターナーの絵の多くは風景画であって、キリスト教の背景知識抜きにしても、ある程度楽しむことができる。西洋絵画は１７世紀あたりだとまだまだ宗教画の残滓がある。後期印象派あたりまで来ると抽象度が高まってきて、理解が難しくなってくる。その意味で、自分のような初心者でも１９世紀あたりの西洋画であればある程度味わえる。

　加えてもう一つ、より重要な理由がある。ターナーの絵画の通奏低音には「崇高（sublime)」という主題が流れていること。この崇高論というテーマ、自分の修論のキーワードの一つでもあり、ターナーへの関心が尽きない。

崇高とターナー

　西洋美学史上、「崇高」は「美（beautiful）」と対比されて論じられる美しさの一種、美的範疇である。雑に言ってしまえば、美は「快」の心情をもたらすのに対し、崇高は「苦」という否定的な契機を経た、「喜ばしい恐怖」とでも言える心情を与える。そしてその崇高なるものは、彼岸の水平的な他者ではなく、此岸の垂直的、超越的他者であることが多くなる。例えば、野に咲く小さな花は「美」であるのに対し、雷や嵐、そびえたつ山々、無限に広がる大洋などは、「崇高」と表現される。

 　次の絵は実際のターナーの絵である。今回のターナー展の広告に使われている。

ウィリアム・ターナー　Fishermen upon a Lee-Shore in Squally サウサンプトン市立美術館

　大時化で荒れ狂う海から逃げてくる一隻の小舟があり、不気味な空は神々しくも見える雷鳴で光り、波は写実的表現を超えて荒々しく描かれている。大自然の猛威を、単に自然のみでなく、あえて人間を目立たない程度に描いており、人為(人間）に対する自然の優位というロマン主義的テーゼを読み取ることもできるかもしれない。空ー海ー岸という三つの構図があり、人間が海から岸へ押し戻されている点を考えれば、キリスト教的堕罪という主題を読み取ることも許されるかもしれない。

 　いずれにせよ、ここには単純な心地よい美しさという意味での「美」ではなく、死の恐怖を想像させるような「崇高」がある。だがそもそもなぜ、わたしたちはこうした畏怖を伴う美しさに惹かれるのか。

 二つの崇高ーバークとカント、あるいはターナーとフリードリヒ

 　崇高概念を美学上で論じた重要な思想家として、エドマンド・バーク（1729－1797）とエマニュエル・カント（1724－1804）がいる。バークは保守主義の父として知られるイギリスの政治家、一方カントはドイツの啓蒙思想家である。

 　従来の研究では、バークの崇高論は「カントの前段階」といった程度扱いしか受けていなかった。しかし近年の研究では両者の崇高論に断絶を見る解釈が主流である*1

 　両者の差異はいくつかあるが、ターナーの崇高論と絡めて重要なのは、認識論的な差異である。

 　イギリス経験論の影響下にあるバークの場合、崇高なるものは経験対象であって、「崇高」が意味するのは、対象そのもの、およびそれを経験した時の主体の感情となる。例えば、崇高な山(=対象)があり、私(=主体)がそれを観て、「崇高だ」と感じる(=感情)、という具合に。バークの崇高論では、対象と感情は崇高たり得ても、主体は崇高ではあり得ない。

 　ところが、カントの哲学では話が変わってくる。主体の認識形式が表象を構成すると考えるカントの場合、崇高なのは主体自身となる。経験論からコペルニクス的転回を経たカントは、まずもって主体の認識があり、その次に対象があると考える。ここから、崇高なる対象があるとすれば、それは認識主体が崇高であるということになる。

 　要するにバークの崇高論では、主体そのものは崇高ではなく、あくまで対象と認識の間に断絶がある。この場合、崇高なる対象を観たとき、それは近づきがたい他者を前にして、自己との絶対的差異を痛覚させられるような感覚に陥る。自己否定および自己の不完全性を惹起するのがバークの崇高論の要諦である。他方カントの崇高論は、主体そのものが崇高となり、自己超越、自己（あるいは理性）の完全性をもたらす。

 　しばしば自己超越と言い換えられる崇高体験だが、先ほどのターナーの絵は、明らかにバーク的な崇高であり、カント的な崇高では説明しきれない。

 　もちろん、ここで言いたいのはカントの崇高論が間違っているという話ではない。たとえば次の絵は、ドイツ・ロマン派のフリードリヒの有名な絵だが、これはカント的崇高に近いと思われる。

カスパー・ダーヴィト・フリードリヒ《雲海の上の旅人》1818年 ハンブルク美術館 ハンブルク

 　ここでは確かに崇高な山々が描かれているが、同時にそれをじっと眺望する人間（主体）も描かれている。ぼんやりと見える奥の頂と、人間が立つ場所には確かに明確な距離がある。しかし人間がその頂（崇高）への願望を持っている。超越性への思考がにじみ出ているのが、フリードリヒのこの絵であり、これはカント的な完全性の崇高に近いと言えるだろう。

 　語源学的にも英語の崇高、”sublime”は、「まぐさ石（lintel）のすぐ下（sub）」*2というような意味であるのに対し、ドイツ語では”erhaben”、「上に（er）持ち上げる（haben）」ことを意味する。ここにも崇高なる対象の「下」を突きつけられるバーク的・イギリス的崇高と、崇高なる対象へと引き上げられ（超越）、近づいていくカント的・ドイツ的崇高の差異が看取できる。

 　ターナーから話が逸れた。ロマン主義の絵画や文芸批評で中心的な概念となる「崇高」概念だが、理屈の上で二つの崇高論は区別すべきではないかと考えていた。そして今回ターナーの絵を見て、やはりターナーはバーク的な崇高の系譜に位置づけられるのだろう。

　当然、この「崇高」のみでターナーの絵をすべて説明できるわけではない。しかしターナーの絵の多くに、ある種の「垂直性」が表現されていることは間違いない。牧歌的な田園風景の中にポツンと巨木（明らかに誇張された大きさを持つもの）がそびえたっていたり、遠く離れた丘の頂上に荘厳な屋敷があったりなど、何らかの「縦」がある。

　自分の関心に引き付けて言えば、水平的な他者との交わりのみを考察対象とし、垂直的な他者を否定・忘却する近代社会にあって、ターナーの絵は重要な意味を持つ、と思う。我々は良く言えば「平等」な、しかし一方で同質的・水平的な他者のみで、あるいはそう想定することで、本当に社会を維持できるのか。暴力が顕現した歴史を忘れることなく、という念押しは当然すべきだが、この問題は避けては通れないと思われる。

*1:例えば、牧野英二（2007）『崇高の哲学』、法政大学出版局。あるいはRyan, V. L. (2001)"The Physiological Sublime: Burke's Critique of Reason." Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 62 No.2, pp.265-79

*2:まぐさ石とは、窓や出入り口の上に渡す水平材のこと。

はじめに

なんとなく始めました。
何かを書く場所が欲しいというぼんやりとした思いから始めるので、継続できるかはわかりません。

明確な目的があるわけでもなく、したがって何を書くのか、どう書くのかも決まっていません。そもそも人に見せるかもわかりません。

が、たまに文章を書きたいという衝動があるのは、どうにも否定できないことのようなので。